

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/137

CHAPTER IX

SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:  
THE CONDUCT OF SECRET OPERATIONS

RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET OPERATIONS

The collection of secret intelligence is closely related to the conduct of secret operations in support of national policy. These operations, including covert psychological warfare, clandestine political activity, sabotage and guerrilla activity, have always been the companions of secret intelligence. The two activities support each other and can be disassociated only to the detriment of both. Effective secret intelligence is a prerequisite to sound secret operations and, where security considerations permit, channels for secret intelligence may also serve secret operations. On the other hand, although the acquisition of intelligence is not the immediate objective of secret operations, the latter may prove to be a most productive source of intelligence.

It was because of our views on the intimate relationship between these two activities that we submitted our Interim Report No. 2, dated May 13, 1948, "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence," which was a document on proposals, then before the National Security Council, for the initiation of a program of secret operations. In that report we made the following observations:

"In carrying out these special operations, the Director of Secret Operations and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence, and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should

131

UNCLASSIFIED

1820

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/138

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primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, because the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.

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Unless the personnel for both operations is under one over-all control in Washington, even though a measure of insulation is provided in the field, there is likely to be overlapping of activities and functions in critical areas which will imperil security.

"The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relationship of the two activities. The British, for example, who had separate systems during the war, have now come around to the view that secret intelligence and secret operations should be carried out under a single operational head and have reorganized their services accordingly."

#### THE OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION

The National Security Council in creating within the Central Intelligence Agency, in accordance with Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act, the Office of Special Projects (now known as the Office of Policy Coordination) recognized these views to the extent that both secret intelligence and secret operations were included within the same organization. However, this action did not go as far as we had recommended, with the result that the Office of Policy Coordination (secret operations) and the Office of Special Operations (secret intelligence) are not bound together by any special relationship and operate as entirely separate Offices.

Although it is too early to appraise the accomplishments of the Office of Policy Coordination which has been in existence only a few months, experience has, in our opinion, already shown that the organizational relationship between it and the Office of Special Operations should be closer. Although the problems with which the two Offices are concerned are so intimately related, there is no arrangement for coordinating their operations under common direction except insofar as they are both under the Director of Central Intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/139

Even this relationship is weakened by the fact that NSC 10/2 which created the Office of Policy Coordination provides that "for purposes of security and of flexibility of operations and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency." Thus, complete separation was made mandatory.

The Office of Policy Coordination, which is the only Office in the Central Intelligence Agency created by direct order of the National Security Council, is also given a special position in that its charter provides that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "insuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities" and that disagreements between the Director and these representatives shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision. Furthermore, the Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination can be appointed only upon nomination by the Secretary of State and approval by the National Security Council.

In practice, the Office of Policy Coordination enjoys a position which gives it direct ties to the Department of State and the National Military Establishment and support from them not enjoyed by the Office of Special Operations. Consequently, the two activities which should be closely integrated are in fact operating with different outside guidance and support, with dissimilar charters, and they occupy a different status within the Central Intelligence Agency.

In our opinion, this situation is unsound. The close relationship between these two activities, as pointed out above, needs to be recognized along with

133

UNCLASSIFIED

1022

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/140

[REDACTED]

the fact that secret intelligence requires the same degree of control and support from the State Department and the Military Establishment as secret operations. As recommended in Chapters VII and VIII, we propose therefore that these two activities be closely integrated (along with parts of the Office of Operations) in a single Operations Division which would enjoy considerable autonomy, in accordance with our over-all recommendations for changes in the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As we have stated above, the operations of the Office of Policy Coordination have been so recently initiated that it is premature to comment upon them in any detail. We believe, however, that the Assistant Director in charge of the Office of Policy Coordination is proceeding wisely in building slowly in this most difficult field.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence and covert operations and the fact that the latter is related to intelligence affecting the national security justifies the placing of the Office of Policy Coordination within the Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated with the other covert Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, namely, the Office of Special Operations, and with the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations, and these three operations should be under single over-all direction (Operations Division) within the Central Intelligence Agency.\*

\* For our recommendations regarding the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch of the Office of Operations, see Chapter VII.

UNCLASSIFIED

1823

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/141

CHAPTER X

THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

GENERAL APPRAISAL

We have reserved for this final chapter on the Central Intelligence Agency the discussion of the post of Director. An appraisal of the qualifications and achievements of the directing personnel is only possible in light of an examination of the entire organization. Within the scope of his mandate under the National Security Act, it is the Director who must guide the organization to the attainment of its objectives, establish its operating policies and win the confidence of other branches of the Government.

This is not an easy task. The Central Intelligence Agency has a diversified and difficult mission to perform. Its success depends, to a large extent, on the support it receives from other agencies which may be ignorant of its problems and suspicious of its prerogatives. It has peculiar administrative, personnel and security problems and has to handle complicated operating situations. Moreover, the pressure to build rapidly has been strong and there has been little time in which to demonstrate substantial accomplishments.

We believe that these difficulties cannot alone explain the principal deficiencies which we have discussed in previous chapters. The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate effectively.

The duties of the Central Intelligence Agency in regard to the coordination of intelligence activities have not been fulfilled. The responsibility

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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for the correlation of national intelligence has not been carried out in such a manner as to provide the policy-makers with coordinated national intelligence estimates. Some activities are being carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency which largely duplicate the work of other departments and agencies, and there has been no adequate attempt to coordinate or centralize others. Generally speaking, satisfactory working relations have not been established with other departments and agencies. Within the Central Intelligence Agency inadequate guidance as to the intelligence requirements of the Government is received from the Director. These deficiencies exist in spite of a broad statutory mandate, reasonable appropriations and support from the National Security Council.

Administrative policies within the Agency contribute to this situation. The internal organization does not reflect an appreciation of the Agency's several distinctive yet inter-related missions under the National Security Act. In fact, the scheme of organization tends to blur and impede the performance of the organization's essential intelligence functions under the Act. The Directorate has given positions of pre-eminence to officials who are primarily administrators yet exert policy control over the intelligence Offices without being qualified to do so. There is little close consultation on intelligence and policy matters between the various stratified levels. Although the heads of the several Offices are allowed considerable latitude in conducting their respective operations, they do not share substantially in the determination of over-all policy.

#### THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECTION

We have also considered the question whether the Director ought to be a civilian. While we recognize that the statute provides that he may be either

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/143

civilian or military we have reached the conclusion that he should be a civilian. We do not mean to exclude the possibility that a Service man may be selected for the post, but if this is done he should resign from active military duty and thereafter work as a civilian. In such a case appropriate provision should be made so that he does not lose his retirement benefits.

We have reached the conclusion that the Director should be civilian because we are convinced that continuity of tenure is essential and complete independence of service ties desirable for carrying out the duties of the Director. The post cannot properly be filled as a mere tour of duty between military assignments. Unless there is such continuity of service and complete independence of action, the Director will not be able to build up the esprit de corps, the technical efficiency, the loyalty of home staff and field workers, which are essential to the success of the enterprise. We agree with the intent of the provision of the National Security Act that the Director "shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise)" by the Service departments, but do not feel that this provision can alone offset the disadvantages to which we have pointed.

It is inevitable that there should be rotation in the Service intelligence agencies, though in recent years that rotation has been far too rapid in the top ranks. However, in the Central Intelligence Agency there should be stability and continuity of leadership.

Finally, we recommend a civilian Director because we believe that in working out a well balanced top selection committee (the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee) for appointing and coordinating Government intelligence, the strong, and properly strong, representation of the military intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 845/144

Services on such a body should be balanced with an equally strong civilian representation.

We have considered the argument that the Director of Central Intelligence, because of the high security requirements of the post, should be a man permanently devoted to Government service, amenable to the disciplines of the Service and free of political ambitions or entanglements. We believe that the qualifications of the Director of Central Intelligence, whether his past experience has been in civilian life or in military or other Government service, should be on so high a level that there would be no more doubt as to the loyalty and responsibility of the Director than of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. In appointing the Director of Central Intelligence with the responsibilities he must carry today, we must select a man to whom we would willingly entrust any position of responsibility whatsoever in our Government.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate effectively.

(2) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Act.

(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence.

(4) As the best hope for continuity of service and the greatest assurance of independence of action a civilian should be Director of Central Intelligence. If a Service man is selected for the post he should resign from active military duty.

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